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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
         Dr. Robert Mathews brought suit against Lancaster 
General Hospital, Columbia Hospital, and several physicians, 
alleging defendants conspired to curtail his professional 
privileges in violation of the Sherman Act and state law.  The 
district court held all defendants except Columbia Hospital were 
immune from suit for monetary damages under the Health Care 
Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C.  11101- 
11152 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).  It also found that Dr. Mathews 
failed to produce evidence of concerted action and antitrust 
injury.  The district court entered summary judgment against Dr. 
Mathews on his antitrust claims and dismissed his pendant state 
law claims.  See Opinion and Order, Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. 
Hosp., Nos. 93-6774, 94-4647 (E.D. Pa. May 4, 1995). 
         Dr. Mathews appeals the grant of immunity, and 
defendants cross-appeal the denial of their motion for attorneys' 
fees.  The Act requires that "a professional review action be 
taken in the reasonable belief that the action was in furtherance 
of quality health care" for immunity to attach.  42 U.S.C.  
11112(a)(1).  Because the evidence in this case supports the 
conclusion that defendants possessed a reasonable belief that 
their action was in furtherance of quality health care, we 
believe the district court correctly found them to be immune from 
suit.  We also hold that the award of attorneys' fees to 
prevailing defendants under the Act lies in the discretion of the 
district court. 
         Dr. Mathews also challenges the district court's grant 
of summary judgment on the antitrust claims.  We believe Dr. 
Mathews has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether defendants engaged in concerted action in restraint of 
trade.  Nor has he shown the existence of an antitrust injury.  
We will affirm. 
                      I.  Factual Background 
         Dr. Robert Mathews is an orthopedic surgeon who has 
been on the staff of Lancaster General Hospital ("Lancaster 
General") since 1973 and Columbia Hospital ("Columbia") since 
1992.  He practices as a corporate partner with another 
orthopedic surgeon, Dr. George Kent.  Lancaster General, 
Columbia, and affiliated corporate entities, the Lancaster 
General Hospital Foundation and the Columbia Hospital Foundation, 
are defendants in this antitrust suit.  Also defendants are 
Orthopedics Associates of Lancaster, Ltd. ("Orthopedic 
Associates"), an orthopedic surgery group practice in competition 
with Dr. Mathews' practice, and several doctors, including Drs. 
Gerald Rothacker, Jr., Thomas Westphal, and John Shertzer, all 
orthopedic surgeons and shareholders of Orthopedic Associates.  
Dr. Mathews alleges that Lancaster General, Columbia, Orthopedic 
Associates, and the individual defendants engaged in an antitrust 
conspiracy to curtail his orthopedics practice and his privileges 
at Lancaster General by improperly sanctioning him in a peer 
review proceeding.  He alleges that Dr. J. Paul Lyet, another 
orthopedic surgeon, Dr. James Argires, a neurosurgeon and a 
member of the Lancaster General Hospital Board of Directors, and 
Dr. Hugh Hoke, a former President of the Medical and Dental Staff 
of Lancaster General Hospital and ex-officio member of the 
Lancaster General Hospital Board, also participated in the 
conspiracy. 
         The chain of events that precipitated this lawsuit 
began on December 27, 1989.  That morning, Dr. Kent was 
performing spinal surgery at Lancaster General.  Dr. Mathews was 
listed as a co-surgeon for the operation.  During the procedure, 
a high speed drill slipped and tore the patient's esophagus.  Dr. 
Kent attempted to repair the esophagus himself without seeking 
outside assistance or a consultation.  Dr. Mathews was not 
present in the operating room when the esophagus was injured.  
Later that evening, the patient suffered complications 
necessitating emergency surgery to repair the tear. 
         After the accident, Dr. Kent's hospital privileges were 
suspended for five days while an ad hoc committee, chaired by Dr. 
Hoke and composed of several other Lancaster General physicians 
(the "Hoke Committee"), investigated.  The Hoke Committee 
concluded that Dr. Kent had acted inappropriately by failing to 
seek a consultation on the patient's torn esophagus.  In a report 
dated January 4, 1990, the Hoke Committee recommended a focused 
review of Dr. Kent's cases for a prospective six month period by 
the Quality Assurance Committee of the Department of Surgery and 
urged that letters of reprimand be placed in the confidential 
files of both Drs. Kent and Mathews.  The report concluded that 
Dr. Mathews, as co-surgeon, bore some responsibility for the 
incident. 
         In accordance with the Hoke Committee's recommendation, 
Dr. Robert Johnson, the President of the Medical and Dental 
Staff, authorized a second ad hoc committee of three board- 
certified orthopedic surgeons to conduct the six-month focused 
review of Dr. Kent's cases.  The committee was selected by Dr. 
Rothacker, Chairman of the Department of Surgery at Lancaster 
General, and consisted of Drs. Rothacker, Westphal and Lyet (the 
"Rothacker Committee").  The parties dispute why the focused 
review was not undertaken by the Quality Assurance Committee as 
the Hoke Committee had recommended.  Drs. Rothacker and Westphal 
are both shareholders of Orthopedic Associates and economic 
competitors of Dr. Mathews. 
         The Rothacker Committee reviewed 208 surgical cases in 
which Dr. Kent served as either the primary or assisting surgeon.  
Apparently Dr. Rothacker played the most important role in the 
review.  At the end of the review which took two years, the 
committee concluded that 27 of the 208 cases evidenced a 
substandard level of care.  Twenty-three of those cases, the 
committee discovered, involved spine surgery, and Dr. Mathews had 
been the primary surgeon in each of those cases.  Dr. Rothacker 
reported the findings of the committee to Dr. Johnson in a March 
19, 1992 letter.  In the letter, Dr. Rothacker recommended that 
the 27 files rated substandard by the committee be sent to an 
outside agency for further review, and "[i]f this agency agrees 
that these cases were not managed in an acceptable fashion, a 
restriction of privileges would be indicated."  Both Dr. Kent and 
Dr. Mathews were sent copies of the letter.  Dr. Rothacker also 
reported the conclusions of his committee to the Executive 
Committee of the Medical and Dental Staff on April 6, 1992, 
although he did not provide the Executive Committee with any 
underlying materials or with the Hoke Committee report.  
Subsequently, in a letter dated April 30, 1992, Dr. Johnson 
informed Dr. Mathews that an independent reviewer would evaluate 
both Dr. Mathews' and Dr. Kent's cases.  Attached to this letter 
was a copy of the minutes of the April 6, 1992 meeting of the 
Executive Committee, which stated in part: 
         In a significant number of these cases [of 
         Dr. Kent], Dr. Robert Mathews was also 
         involved in the surgery, as primary or 
         assistant surgeon.  Therefore, any review by 
         an outside review agency will also involve a 
         review [of] Dr. Mathews' performance in these 
         cases, and may result in a recommendation 
         regarding Dr. Mathews' clinical privileges. 
         At the time he was conducting the review of Dr. Kent's 
cases, Dr. Rothacker was also concerned about economic trends 
affecting the medical profession.  In a November 1991 letter to 
the Lancaster General Hospital Foundation Board, Dr. Rothacker 
wrote:  "The economic climate for medical practice, as you know, 
is not favorable at this time.  Most of us anticipate a 
significant drop in our gross earning ability and most likely our 
net earning ability."  In January 1993, in order to respond to 
negative economic trends, Orthopedic Associates, of which Dr. 
Rothacker was a principal, and Lancaster General formed a joint 
venture--the MidAtlantic Orthopedic Institute.  The Institute was 
intended "to develop, operate and market a comprehensive 
orthopedic care and orthopedic surgical services program, through 
[Lancaster General]."  Orthopedic Associates was to be the 
exclusive provider of orthopedic surgical services at the 
Institute, and Lancaster General agreed to dedicate operating 
room time and support personnel to Orthopedic Associates.  Dr. 
Mathews was a major user of operating room time at Lancaster 
General. 
         Meanwhile, Lancaster General had retained the American 
Medico-Legal Foundation to select an independent reviewer to 
review the 27 cases in which the Rothacker Committee had found 
that Drs. Kent and Mathews had provided substandard care.  The 
Foundation chose Philip D. Wilson, Jr., M.D., of Cornell Medical 
College.  Dr. Wilson is a board certified orthopedic surgeon who 
has taught in the field of orthopedic surgery for over 40 years.  
Drs. Kent and Mathews were given an opportunity to submit 
additional information regarding the files to be sent to the 
independent reviewer, and both submitted some supplementary 
materials.  On March 18, 1993, Dr. Wilson issued a report 
concluding the quality of care rendered by Drs. Kent and Mathews 
was inadequate and below acceptable standards.  Dr. Wilson's 
report concluded: 
         the pattern and trend of care reflected by 
         review of the records of the 23 patients 
         undergoing lumbar spinal surgery by these two 
         surgeons in a period of 6 months are 
         substandard in the following ways: 
 
         (1)  Incredibly poor documentation of patient 
         work-ups lacking clear definition of primary 
         complaints, clear histories of present 
         illnesses, well recorded past medical 
         histories, complete and orderly specific 
         orthopedic and neurological examinations, and 
         specifics of prior ambulatory care and 
         treatments. 
 
         (2)  Lack of timely review, editing and 
         correction of dictated and typed office 
         notes. 
 
         (3)  Lack of timely signature to authorize 
         such notes. 
 
         (4)  Poor use of consultants such as 
         neurologists, neurosurgeons, and/or 
         electroneurodiagnosticians. 
 
         (5)  Great dependence on literal and non- 
         objective interpretations of CAT scans 
         without direct clinical correlations for 
         diagnosis. 
 
         (6)  Failure to use alternative imaging 
         techniques such as the full spectrum of 
         routine x-rays, MRIs, and myelographic 
         enhanced CTs. 
 
         (7)  Lack of judgment in applying extensive 
         lumbar surgical decompressions and fusions to 
         patients irrespective of age and type of 
         condition. 
 
         (8)  Lack of well controlled ambulatory non- 
         operative techniques such as bracing, 
         exercise therapy, pain blocks and 
         physiotherapeutic modalities. 
 
         (9)  Nonsystematic use of medications such as 
         NSAIDs, muscle relaxants, analgesics, etc. 
 
         (10) Lack of objective hospitalization 
         progress notes recording such details as 
         progress of wound, recovery milestones, etc. 
 
         (11) The lack of a concise but descriptive 
         discharge note with details of course as well 
         as diagnoses, operative procedures and 
         complications. 
 
         (12) Deficient operative notes without 
         details of intraoperative findings and 
         annotated justification for widespread and 
         radical decompressive and stabilization 
         procedures. 
 
         (13) Lack of understanding of principles for 
         suitable internal fixation of the spine. 
 
         (14) Lack of observing suitable principles 
         for optimal results from spinal arthrodesis 
         grafting techniques. 
Dr. Wilson recommended that both doctors' privileges to perform 
spine surgery be restricted until they were able to "demonstrate 
a renewed and updated understanding of present day principles and 
practice of this type of surgery."  By letter dated May 10, 1993, 
Dr. Mathews was advised of Dr. Wilson's conclusions and furnished 
with a copy of his peer review report.  The letter warned that 
any restriction of privileges would be reported to the National 
Practitioner Data Bank. 
         In July 1993, Dr. Mathews was negotiating with 
Lancaster General over the possible sale of a property adjacent 
to Lancaster General in which he held an interest.  He sought to 
link those negotiations to the hospital's proposed actions 
regarding his privileges.  Dr. Mathews believed an understanding 
had been reached with Lancaster General that he would sell the 
property and voluntarily cease to perform spine surgery, and 
Lancaster General would not submit an adverse report to the 
National Practitioner Data Bank.  In accordance with his 
understanding, Dr. Mathews voluntarily did not request privileges 
for spine surgery in his 1994-95 staff privileges application to 
Lancaster General, submitted on July 29, 1993.  But on August 27, 
1993, Dr. Hoke wrote to Dr. Mathews rejecting the linkage of the 
sale of property and Dr. Mathews' staff privileges.   
         On September 16, 1993, the Lancaster General Hospital 
Board of Directors voted to restrict Dr. Mathews' privileges to 
perform spine surgery as either primary or assisting surgeon.  
They also voted to require Dr. Mathews to obtain a second opinion 
or consultation before performing prosthetic joint surgery, 
arthroscopy, or hand or foot surgery for a period of 12 months.  
Dr. Shertzer (a partner in Orthopedic Associates), Dr. Argires, 
and Dr. Hoke abstained from voting, although they were members of 
the Board.  The Board notified Dr. Mathews of its decision by 
letter dated September 22, 1993 and informed him of his right to 
a fair hearing under Lancaster General Hospital Medical Staff 
Bylaws.  On October 26, 1993, Dr. Mathews requested a hearing, 
and the Board subsequently voted to suspend the restrictions on 
his privileges until a hearing could be held.  Before the hearing 
was scheduled, however, Dr. Mathews filed this suit. 
         During this course of events, Dr. Mathews also applied 
for staff privileges at Columbia Hospital.  Columbia granted Dr. 
Mathews "temporary privileges" in the Division of Surgery, 
Orthopedics, effective April 22, 1992.  Later that year, Dr. 
Mathews was granted "provisional courtesy privileges" for a 
period of twelve months.  Near the end of that period, on August 
25, 1993, Columbia's Credentials Committee recommended that Dr. 
Mathews' privileges be upgraded to "courtesy privileges," and 
Columbia upgraded Dr. Mathews' status the next month.  Dr. 
Mathews submitted a reappointment application to have his 
privileges at Columbia renewed for the year beginning January 1, 
1994, but in the course of reviewing Dr. Mathews' application, 
Mr. Robert Katana, President and CEO of Columbia Hospital, 
discovered the application did not contain a reappointment 
reference from Lancaster General.  Columbia requires all staff 
physicians to submit a reappointment reference from any other 
hospital where they exercise privileges, and Mr. Katana requested 
such a reference from Dr. Mathews.  Dr. Mathews never submitted 
the reappointment reference from Lancaster General, and his 
courtesy staff privileges at Columbia expired on December 31, 
1993.  Thereafter, Columbia granted Dr. Mathews "temporary 
privileges."  In September 1993, at the time Mr. Katana was 
considering Dr. Mathews' application for an extension of 
privileges, Lancaster General was in the process of negotiating a 
merger with Columbia Hospital. 
                     II.  Procedural History 
         Dr. Mathews brought suit against Lancaster General 
Hospital, Columbia Hospital, and various staff members of 
Lancaster General on December 15, 1993, and against Orthopedic 
Associates of Lancaster, Ltd. on August 1, 1994.  The two cases 
were consolidated.  The district court granted summary judgment 
to Lancaster General, Orthopedic Associates, and the individual 
defendants on federal and state claims for monetary relief 
because it found they enjoyed immunity from monetary damages 
under  11111(a) of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act.  The 
district court also granted summary judgment to all defendants, 
including Columbia, on Dr. Mathews' antitrust claims, holding he 
had not produced evidence showing concerted action on the part of 
the defendants or an antitrust injury.  The district court 
entered summary judgment on Dr. Mathews' federal claims for 
injunctive relief and dismissed without prejudice state claims 
for injunctive relief.  See Opinion and Order, Mathews v. 
Lancaster Gen. Hosp., Nos. 93-6774, 94-4647 (E.D. Pa. May 4, 
1995) ("Opinion and Order").  Mathews appeals the district 
court's grant of summary judgment.  All defendants except 
Columbia appeal the district court's refusal to grant attorneys' 
fees. 
         We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  1291 to review 
the district court's final order.  Our review of the district 
court's grant of summary judgment is plenary.  Petruzzi's IGA 
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Moyer Packing Co. v. Petruzzi's 
IGA Supermarkets, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 554 (1993). 
          III.  The Health Care Quality Improvement Act 
         This case arises under the Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.  11101-11152 (1988 & Supp. 
IV 1992).  Congress passed the Act "to improve the quality of 
medical care by encouraging physicians to identify and discipline 
physicians who are incompetent or who engage in unprofessional 
behavior."  H.R. Rep. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6287, 6384, 6384.  Congress 
believed incompetent physicians could be identified through 
"effective professional peer review," which it chose to encourage 
by granting limited immunity from suits for money damages to 
participants in professional peer review actions.  42 U.S.C.  
11101(5), 11111(a).  Congress also sought "to restrict the 
ability of incompetent physicians to move from State to State 
without disclosure or discovery of the physician's previous 
damaging or incompetent performance" by creating an obligation to 
report professional review sanctions to the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services.  42 U.S.C.  11101(2), 
11134.  
         The standards that a professional review action must 
satisfy in order to entitle participants in the review process to 
immunity are set forth in 42 U.S.C.  11112(a) and include 
certain fairness and due process requirements.  For immunity to 
attach, the results of the action must be reported to the State 
Board of Medical Examiners in compliance with 42 U.S.C.  11133.  
         The Act was intended to deter antitrust suits by 
disciplined physicians.  Congress believed "[t]he threat of 
private money damage liability under Federal laws, including 
treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably 
discourages physicians from participating in effective 
professional peer review."  42 U.S.C.  11101(4).  The Act 
contains a fee shifting provision to discourage frivolous suits 
by physicians disciplined in peer review proceedings.  See 42 
U.S.C.  11113. 
         The Act includes a presumption that a professional 
review activity meets the standards for immunity, "unless the 
presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence."  42 
U.S.C.  11112(a).  This presumption results in an "unusual 
standard" for reviewing summary judgment orders under the Act.  
"In a sense, the presumption language in [the Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act] means that the plaintiff bears the burden of 
proving that the peer review process was not reasonable."  Bryan 
v. James E. Holmes Regional Medical Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1333 
(11th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 
1363 (1995).  "We must examine the record in this case to 
determine whether [Dr. Mathews] satisfied his burden of producing 
evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the 
Hospital's peer review disciplinary process failed to meet the 
standards of the [Act]."  Id. at 1334; see also Austin v. 
McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1992) (same). 
          A.  Professional Review Actions under the Act 
          
         Dr. Mathews argues Lancaster General and defendant 
physicians conducted at least two "professional review actions" 
relating to him:  first, the March 19, 1992 letter of Dr. 
Rothacker on behalf of the Rothacker Committee recommending a 
focused review of his cases and a possible restriction of his 
privileges, and second, the September 16, 1993 vote by the 
Lancaster General Hospital Board of Directors to revoke his spine 
privileges.  The Act defines a "professional review action" as: 
         an action or recommendation of a professional 
         review body which is taken or made in the 
         conduct of professional review activity . . . 
         which affects (or may affect) adversely the 
         clinical privileges, or membership in a 
         professional society, of a physician.  Such 
         term . . . also includes professional review 
         activities relating to a professional review 
         action. 
 
42 U.S.C.  11151(9).  Dr. Mathews contends that Dr. Rothacker's 
March 19, 1992 letter constituted a professional review action 
because it made a recommendation that had the potential to 
adversely affect his clinical privileges.  He argues the district 
court erred by not treating the Rothacker Committee's letter as a 
professional review action and not assessing it for compliance 
with the fairness and procedural standards outlined in 42 U.S.C. 
 11112(a). 
         The district court, reading the definitions of 
"professional review action" and "professional review activity" 
together, concluded that "the term `professional review activity' 
refers to preliminary investigative measures taken in a 
`reasonable effort to obtain the facts' relevant to a possible 
change in a physician's privileges, while the term `professional 
review action' refers to the decision that results from a review 
of the facts obtained."  See Opinion and Order, slip op. at 21.  
          It concluded Dr. Rothacker's letter was a part of the 
preliminary investigative process and therefore not a 
"professional review action."  We agree with the district court's 
analysis. 
         The definition of "professional review action" 
encompasses decisions or recommendations by peer review bodies 
that directly curtail a physician's clinical privileges or impose 
some lesser sanction that may eventually affect a physician's 
privileges.  "Professional review actions" do not include a 
decision or recommendation to monitor the standard of care 
provided by a physician or factfinding to ascertain whether a 
physician has provided adequate care.  These are "professional 
review activities."  See Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 
789 F. Supp. 1054, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 1992) ("[P]rofessional review 
activity means the investigative process during and/or upon which 
a professional review action, i.e., a decision, is made."), 
aff'd, 29 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 936 
(1995).  We believe Dr. Rothacker's March 12, 1992 letter was a 
part of ongoing professional review activities.  It did not 
constitute a decision to restrict Dr. Mathews' privileges, nor 
did it recommend that Dr. Mathews' privileges be restricted 
immediately.  In fact, the letter did not impose any penalty.  
Instead, it recommended further investigation and review by an 
outside agency before any limitations were placed on Dr. Mathews' 
privileges. No professional review action occurred here until the 
Board's September 16, 1993 vote to suspend Dr. Mathews' 
privileges.  See Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d at 736 ("no 
`action' was taken in this case until . . . the first occasion 
when [plaintiff's] clinical privileges were adversely affected.  
Prior to that time, he had been monitored and reviewed, but no 
professional review body had limited his clinical privileges or 
adopted a recommendation that they be limited.").  Because Dr. 
Rothacker's March 19, 1992 letter was not a professional review 
action, the district court correctly held it did not have to meet 
the standards set forth in 42 U.S.C.  11112(a). 
                    B.  Immunity under the Act 
         Dr. Mathews contends summary judgment was inappropriate 
because there were disputed issues of fact as to whether the 
defendants met the standard for immunity set forth in 42 U.S.C.  
11112(a).  For immunity under  11111(a) to attach, four 
requirements must be met.  The professional review action must be 
taken: 
              (1) in the reasonable belief that the 
         action was in the furtherance of quality 
         health care, 
              (2) after a reasonable effort to obtain 
         the facts of the matter, 
              (3) after adequate notice and hearing 
         procedures are afforded to the physician 
         involved or after such other procedures as 
         are fair to the physician under the 
         circumstances, and 
              (4) in the reasonable belief that the 
         action was warranted by the facts known after 
         such reasonable effort to obtain facts and 
         after meeting the requirement of paragraph 
         (3). 
42 U.S.C.  11112(a).  We will undertake the inquiry mandated by 
each of  11112(a)'s four prongs to determine whether the 
district court's grant of summary judgment on the basis of 
immunity was proper. 
         1.   Reasonable Belief that the Action was in the 
              Furtherance of Quality Health Care 
         On appeal, Dr. Mathews argues he raised material issues 
of fact as to whether participants in the peer review proceedings 
at Lancaster General acted "in the reasonable belief that [a 
restriction of his privileges] was in the furtherance of quality 
health care," as is required under  11112(a)(1) of the Act.  He 
maintains that defendants were in direct economic competition 
with him, which supports an inference of their bad faith.  The 
district court held that  11112(a)(1) mandates an objective 
standard, and "assertions of bad faith and anticompetitive motive 
are irrelevant to the question of whether a decision was taken in 
a reasonable belief that it would further quality health care."  
Opinion and Order, slip op. at 29-30. 
         Other courts of appeals, in evaluating summary judgment 
orders granted on the basis of immunity, have uniformly applied 
an objective standard in assessing compliance with  11112(a).  
See Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 37 F.3d 1026, 1030 
(4th Cir. 1994) ("The standard is an objective one which looks to 
the totality of the circumstances."); Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 
1478, 1485 (9th Cir. 1994) ("the `reasonableness' requirements of 
 11112(a) were intended to create an objective standard, rather 
than a subjective standard"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1400 
(1995).  They have held that a defendant's subjective bad faith 
is irrelevant under  11112(a) and have upheld a finding of 
immunity if, on the basis of the record, the court could conclude 
that the professional review action would further quality health 
care.  See, e.g., Bryan v. James E. Holmes Regional Medical Ctr., 
33 F.3d 1318, 1335 (11th Cir. 1994) (Plaintiff's "assertions of 
hostility do not support his position [that the hospital is not 
entitled to the Act's protections] because they are irrelevant to 
the reasonableness standards of  11112(a).  The test is an 
objective one, so bad faith is immaterial.  The real issue is the 
sufficiency of the basis for the [Hospital's] actions."), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1363 (1995); Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 
734 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); see also Opinion and Order, slip op. 
at 30. 
         We agree with our sister circuits that  11112(a) 
imposes an objective standard.  The House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce's report on the Act stated with regard to  11112(a)(1): 
         Initially, the Committee considered a "good 
         faith" standard for professional review 
         actions.  In response to concerns that "good 
         faith" might be misinterpreted as requiring 
         only a test of the subjective state of mind 
         of the physicians conducting the professional 
         review action, the Committee changed to a 
         more objective "reasonable belief" standard. 
H.R. Rep. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986), reprinted in1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6392-93.  Although the quoted passage 
relates to a previous version of the Act and to  11112(a)(1) in 
particular, we believe that Congress' use of the words 
"reasonable belief" in both  11112(a)(1) and (4) indicates an 
intention to create an objective standard with regard to  
11112(a) as a whole.  Under  11112(a)(1), this standard "will 
be satisfied if the reviewers, with the information available to 
them at the time of the professional review action, would 
reasonably have concluded that their actions would restrict 
incompetent behavior or would protect patients."  H.R. Rep. No. 
903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6393.  The court should look to the totality of 
the circumstances.  Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 37 
F.3d at 1030. 
         Dr. Mathews has presented evidence that defendants, 
including Lancaster General as a joint venturer in the 
MidAtlantic Orthopedic Institute, were his competitors.  But he 
has not presented evidence that the professional review action 
taken by Lancaster General's Board was motivated by anything 
other than a reasonable belief that it would further quality 
health care.  As the district court concluded after carefully 
reviewing the evidence, Dr. Mathews has failed to rebut  
11112(a)'s presumption that the peer reviewers' action met the 
standard for immunity from suit for monetary damages: 
         The undisputed evidence shows that, in making 
         its decision, the Board relied on the 
         findings of the Rothacker Committee and the 
         independent expert Dr. Wilson, as reported to 
         the Board by LGH CEO Mr. Young and defendant 
         Dr. Hoke.  The Rothacker Committee report 
         represents the conclusion of a committee of 
         three board certified orthopedic surgeons 
         that 23 of Dr. Mathews' cases during a six- 
         month period did not meet appropriate 
         standards of care.  These findings were 
         confirmed by those of the independent expert, 
         Dr. Wilson of Cornell Medical College. . . . 
 
              After reviewing the cases identified by 
         the Rothacker Committee, Dr. Wilson submitted 
         a detailed report in which he concluded that 
         the pattern and trend of care reflected were 
         "substandard" in fourteen separate respects, 
         which he enumerated. . . . The restrictions 
         voted on by the Board appear tailored to meet 
         the concerns raised by Dr. Wilson's report.  
         Thus, in addition to the statutory 
         presumption in favor of defendants, the 
         evidentiary record in this case provides 
         ample support for the conclusion that the 
         Board's action was taken in a reasonable 
         belief that it would further quality health 
         care. . . . 
 
              Dr. Mathews has produced no evidence 
         that anticompetitive considerations actually 
         entered into the Board's decisionmaking 
         process. . . . There is no evidence that the 
         reports contained or that the Board 
         considered any supporting evidence that was 
         not related to the quality of health care.  
         Rather, Dr. Mathews appears to base his 
         argument solely on his allegation that the 
         defendants were his competitors and stood to 
         gain by eliminating him from the market. 
 
              Mere participation by plaintiff's 
         competitors in the Hoke or Rothacker 
         Committee investigations or the Board's vote, 
         however, does not run afoul of the [Health 
         Care Quality Improvement Act].  Although the 
         Act suggests that a hearing officer or 
         individuals sitting on a hearing panel should 
         not be in direct competition  with the 
         physician who is the subject of the hearing, 
         see  11112(b)(3)(A)(ii) & (iii), it imposes 
         no such requirement on participants in other 
         phases of the peer review process.  To the 
         extent plaintiff is attempting to suggest 
         that it was not reasonable for the Board to 
         rely on the Rothacker report because it was 
         generated by orthopedic surgeons who are 
         plaintiff's competitors, this contention is 
         negated by the fact that the committee's 
         findings were confirmed by Dr. Wilson, who is 
         not in any way in competition with Dr. 
         Mathews.  Moreover, we note that although the 
         [Act] does not require it, the physician 
         members of the Board, defendant Drs. Hoke, 
         Argires, and Shertzer, abstained from voting 
         on the privilege restrictions.  Thus 
         plaintiff's arguments concerning his 
         competitors' participation in the peer review 
         process cannot serve to rebut the presumption 
         in favor of defendants. 
Opinion and Order, slip op. at 28-32.  Because Dr. Mathews has 
not rebutted the presumption that defendants' actions were taken 
in the reasonable belief that they would further quality health 
care, and, in fact, the evidence supports the conclusion that 
defendants were motivated by legitimate health care concerns, the 
district court correctly found defendants met the requirements of 
the first prong of  11112(a) of the Act. 
         2.   Reasonable Effort to Obtain the Facts 
         Dr. Mathews also argues that defendants did not engage 
in a reasonable effort to obtain the facts under  11112(a)(2) of 
the Act.  He points to several problems in the factfinding 
process, specifically that the Rothacker Committee was composed 
of competitors, did not request formal authorization to begin a 
focused review of Dr. Mathews' cases, and did not reveal to the 
Board the extent of participation in the review process of each 
member of the committee.  Dr. Mathews also emphasizes the Board 
did not undertake an independent investigation and did not 
consider Lancaster General routine internal quality reviews.  
Contrast Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 
1390, 1399 (D. Md. 1993) (Board questioned plaintiff's attorney 
and reviewed records), aff'd, 37 F.3d 1026 (4th Cir. 1994). 
         Although Dr. Mathews challenges the integrity of the 
Rothacker Committee, he has not rebutted the presumption that 
defendants engaged in a reasonable effort to obtain the facts.  
The investigation of the Rothacker Committee, as a preliminary, 
investigative "professional review activity," was not required 
independently to meet the requirements of  11112(a).  See suprapart 
III.A.  The Act contains no provision barring competitors 
from participating in "professional review activities."  Nor does 
it require formal authorization for preliminary "professional 
review activities."  Moreover, it is undisputed that Dr. Mathews' 
standard of care became the focus of attention during the 
Rothacker Committee's review of Dr. Kent's cases, which 
necessarily encompassed the cases of Dr. Mathews. 
         The relevant inquiry under  11112(a)(2) is whether the 
totality of the process leading up to the Board's "professional 
review action" on September 16, 1993 evidenced a reasonable 
effort to obtain the facts of the matter.  The Board relied on 
the recommendations of two separate reviews.  The initial review 
by the Rothacker Committee took over two years to complete and 
reviewed 208 cases.  The second review was performed by an 
independent outside reviewer retained by Lancaster General.  The 
outside reviewer, Dr. Wilson, confirmed the findings of the 
Rothacker Committee.  The district court correctly concluded that 
Dr. Mathews has not overcome the presumption that the Board 
undertook reasonable efforts to obtain the facts of the matter in 
compliance with  11112(a)(2).  See Opinion and Order, slip op. 
at 38. 
         3.   Adequate Notice and Hearing Procedures 
         Dr. Mathews does not contest on appeal that Lancaster 
General and the defendant individual physicians afforded him 
adequate notice and hearing procedures in accordance with  
11112(a)(3) of the Act.  A review of the record confirms 
defendants complied with  11112(a)(3). 
         Dr. Mathews was given notice of the progress of the 
professional review activities at each step.  A copy of the March 
19, 1992 letter of the Rothacker Committee was sent to Dr. 
Mathews at the same time its conclusions were reported to the 
Medical and Dental Staff.  On April 30, 1992, Dr. Johnson sent a 
letter to Dr. Mathews informing him that an outside reviewer 
would review the 27 cases identified by the Rothacker Committee.  
This letter included minutes of the Medical and Dental Staff 
Executive Committee meeting, in which the Executive Committee 
indicated that the outside review "may result in a recommendation 
regarding Dr. Mathews' clinical privileges."  Before the outside 
reviewer, Dr. Wilson, commenced his review, Dr. Mathews was given 
the opportunity to provide additional materials, and he did so.  
Dr. Mathews was provided with a copy of Dr. Wilson's March 18, 
1993 report.  Lancaster General informed Dr. Mathews that it was 
considering placing restrictions on his privileges and it gave 
Dr. Mathews the opportunity to respond informally.  After the 
Board voted to restrict Dr. Mathews' privileges on September 16, 
1993, Dr. Young informed Dr. Mathews of the Board's decision by 
letter dated September 22, 1993.  The letter informed Dr. Mathews 
of his right to request a hearing, stated the time limit for 
doing so, and provided a summary of the rights he would be 
afforded at the hearing.  The letter also stated that Dr. 
Mathews would be provided the procedural safeguards set for forth 
in the Act. 
         After Dr. Mathews requested a hearing, the Board 
suspended the proposed restrictions until the hearing could be 
held.  Shortly thereafter, Dr. Mathews filed this suit, short- 
circuiting the completion of the review procedures called for by 
 11112(b)(3).  Even though the hearing has never been held, 
Lancaster General complied with the safe harbor provision,  
11112(b), in all respects until the time when Dr. Mathews filed 
suit.  In fact, Lancaster General provided Dr. Mathews with 
additional notices and procedural rights during the conduct of 
preliminary professional review activities that were not required 
by the Act.  We do not believe a plaintiff can deprive defendants 
of immunity by refusing to participate in the hearing required 
under  11112(b)(3).  Accordingly, we conclude Dr. Mathews has 
not raised a material issue of fact rebutting the presumption 
that defendants complied with  11112(a)(3) of the Act. 
         4.   Reasonable Belief that the Action was Warranted by 
              the Facts Known 
         Finally, Dr. Mathews disputes whether the Board's 
professional review action against him was taken in the 
reasonable belief that it "was warranted by the facts known," as 
required under  11112(a)(4) of the Act.   
         Dr. Wilson, the outside reviewer, concluded that Dr. 
Mathews had provided substandard care in spine surgery cases.  
The Board then placed restrictions on Dr. Mathews' privileges to 
conduct spine surgery.  Because these restrictions were tailored 
to address the health care concerns raised by the reports of the 
Rothacker Committee and Dr. Wilson, we believe the evidence 
supports the conclusion that the restrictions were imposed based 
on a reasonable belief that they were warranted by the facts 
known.  Moreover, Dr. Mathews has produced insufficient evidence 
to rebut the presumption that the Board's action was taken in the 
reasonable belief that it was warranted.  As we have noted, Dr. 
Mathews relies on the opinion provided by his expert witness, Dr. 
Goldner, who disagreed with Dr. Wilson's conclusions.  While the 
conflicting expert reports raise an issue of fact as to the 
adequacy of care provided by Dr. Mathews, they do not rebut the 
presumption that the Board made its decision in the reasonable 
belief that it was warranted by the facts known.  The conclusions 
of Dr. Goldner's report were not among "the facts known" at the 
time of the professional review action.  Furthermore, the 
Rothacker Committee report and the report of Dr. Wilson were not 
so obviously mistaken or inadequate as to make reliance on them 
unreasonable.  The requirements of  11112(a)(4) have been met as 
well. 
              5.  Summary on Immunity under the Act 
         We hold  11112(a) of the Act imposes an objective 
standard. Under  11112(a)(1), this standard is met when peer 
reviewers reasonably conclude that their actions will restrict 
incompetent behavior or protect patients.  Because the record 
supports the district court's holding that Lancaster General and 
the individual defendants reasonably believed their actions would 
further quality health care and also fulfilled the remaining 
three prongs of  11112(a) of the Act, we will affirm the 
district court's judgment that defendants are immune from suit 
for monetary damages. 
                      IV.  Antitrust Claims 
         Dr. Mathews alleges Lancaster General, Orthopedic 
Associates, Columbia and the individual defendants conspired to 
conduct a sham peer review investigation and to restrict his 
privileges at Lancaster General and Columbia.  He argues the 
defendants' conspiracy violated  1 of the Sherman Act, entitling 
him to treble damages under 15 U.S.C.  15 (1994) and to 
injunctive relief under 15 U.S.C.  26.  Although several of the 
defendants are immune from money damages under the Health Care 
Quality Improvement Act, we must still examine Dr. Mathews' 
antitrust claims in order to determine whether he is entitled to 
injunctive relief.  The district court granted summary judgment 
to all defendants on the antitrust claims. 
         Our review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary.  
Summary judgment must be granted where no genuine issue of 
material fact exists for resolution at trial and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c).  The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence 
of any genuine issues of material fact.  Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  Where the nonmoving party 
bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may meet its 
burden by showing that the nonmoving party has not offered 
evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to its case.  Id. at 322. 
         Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: 
         Every contract, combination in the form of 
         trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
         restraint of trade or commerce among the 
         several States, or with foreign nations, is 
         declared to be illegal. 
15 U.S.C.  1.  To establish a section 1 violation, a plaintiff 
must prove: 
         (1) concerted action by the defendants; (2) 
         that produced anticompetitive effects within 
         the relevant product and geographic markets; 
         (3) that the concerted actions were illegal; 
         and (4) that it was injured as a proximate 
         result of the concerted action. 
Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 
F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Moyer Packing 
Co. v. Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 554 (1993).  
The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, 
holding that Dr. Mathews had not presented sufficient evidence of 
concerted action and antitrust injury. 
                       A.  Concerted Action 
         "The very essence of a section 1 claim, of course, is 
the existence of an agreement."  Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. 
Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 999 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
115 S. Ct. 1691 (1995).  For a section 1 claim, "a plaintiff must 
prove `concerted action,' a collective reference to the `contract 
. . . combination or conspiracy.'"  Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. 
Carrier Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1995).  A 
"`unity of purpose or a common design and understanding or a 
meeting of the minds in an unlawful arrangement' must exist to 
trigger section 1 liability."  Copperweld Corp. v. Independence 
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984) (quoting American Tobacco 
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946)).  "Unilateral 
action, no matter what its motivation, cannot violate [section] 
1."  Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 
105, 110 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981). 
         The district court concluded the Board acted 
independently and not in concert with Orthopedic Associates or 
the individual defendants in taking the professional review 
action against Dr. Mathews.  See Opinion and Order, slip op. at 
50-54.  We believe the evidence supports the district court's 
conclusion.  It is undisputed that only the Board had the 
authority to restrict Dr. Mathews' privileges.  Where a hospital 
board has ultimate decision making authority, "[s]imply making a 
peer review recommendation does not prove the existence of a 
conspiracy [among the hospital and its staff]; there must be 
something more such as a conscious commitment by the medical 
staff to coerce the hospital into accepting its recommendation."  
Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 706 (4th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992); see also Todorov v. 
DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1459 (11th Cir. 1991) 
("[T]hat the hospital board had before it recommendations from 
the medical staff and the radiologists were pleased with [the 
hospital's] ultimate decision is, standing alone, insufficient to 
infer an antitrust conspiracy.").  Dr. Mathews has not raised a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Orthopedic 
Associates or Drs. Rothacker, Westphal, Shertzer, Lyet, Argires 
and Hoke coerced or lobbied the Board to restrict Dr. Mathews' 
privileges. 
         Dr. Mathews views the activities of the Rothacker 
Committee as evidence of a campaign of its members, Drs. 
Rothacker, Westphal, and Lyet, to restrict his privileges.  The 
Rothacker Committee's recommendation was made eighteen months 
before the Board's vote.  There is no evidence that any doctor on 
the Rothacker Committee had any further connection with the peer 
review process thereafter.  Moreover, the Rothacker Committee 
suggested further review of Dr. Mathews' cases by an outside 
reviewer.  These facts negate an inference that the Rothacker 
Committee or its members were attempting to coerce the Board into 
restricting Dr. Mathews' privileges. 
         Dr. Mathews also points out the presence of Drs. 
Shertzer, Argires, and Hoke during the Board's vote to restrict 
his privileges.  We do not believe the defendants' presence gives 
rise to an inference of an antitrust conspiracy. All the 
defendants abstained from voting, and Dr. Mathews has presented 
no evidence that defendants attempted to influence or lobby the 
Board. 
         Dr. Mathews argues that the contractual relationship 
between Lancaster General and Orthopedic Associates relating to 
the MidAtlantic Orthopedic Institute supports an inference that 
Orthopedic Associates and members of Orthopedic Associates, Drs. 
Rothacker, Westphal, and Shertzer, unduly influenced the Board.  
Although a contractual relationship might support an inference 
that Orthopedic Associates may have had the power to influence 
the Board's decision, Dr. Mathews has not produced any evidence 
that such coercion actually occurred.   
         Moreover, we believe peer review actions, when properly 
conducted, generally enhance competition and improve the quality 
of medical care.  See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 821 n.60 
(3d Cir. 1984) ("it seems obvious that by restricting staff 
privileges to doctors who have achieved a predetermined level of 
medical competence, a hospital will enhance its reputation and 
the quality of medical care it delivers.  Thus such action is 
pro-competitive"), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985); Oksanen v. 
Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d at 709 ("[T]he peer review process, 
by policing competence and conduct of doctors, can enhance 
competition.").  We are reluctant to draw inferences of an 
antitrust conspiracy from ambiguous circumstantial evidence in 
cases where the challenged activity promotes competition.  
Evidence of conduct, which is "as consistent with permissible 
competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, without more, 
support even an inference of conspiracy."  Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597 
n.21 (1986); see also Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 
37 F.3d at 1001.  "[T]here must be evidence that tends to exclude 
the possibility of independent action."  Monsanto Co. v. Spray- 
Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). 
         Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the 
Board voted to restrict Dr. Mathews' privileges for legitimate 
health care reasons.  The Board relied on the report of the 
independent reviewer, Dr. Wilson, in addition to Lancaster 
General's own internal review procedure conducted by the 
Rothacker Committee.  Although Dr. Mathews has produced some 
circumstantial evidence of an economic motivation on the part of 
defendants, the evidence he refers to is equally consistent with 
permissible competition and the promotion of quality patient 
care.  Dr. Mathews has not produced evidence that tends to 
exclude the possibility that the Board acted independently.  
Under these circumstances, we are reluctant to infer an antitrust 
conspiracy, and we believe the district court correctly granted 
summary judgment to Lancaster General and the individual 
defendants.  Cf. Willman v. Heartland Hospital East, 34 F.3d 605, 
611 (8th Cir. 1994) ("the limitation and eventual termination of 
[plaintiff's] staff privileges . . . is as consistent with the 
lawful motive of promoting quality patient care as with an 
anticompetitive motive and therefore, without more, does not give 
rise to an inference of an antitrust conspiracy"), cert. denied, 
115 S. Ct. 1361 (1995). 
         Dr. Mathews also has not produced sufficient evidence 
of concerted action on the part of Lancaster General and Columbia 
Hospital to survive summary judgment.  While it is true that 
Lancaster General and Columbia were conducting merger 
negotiations at the time of Dr. Mathews' application for a 
renewal of privileges, the undisputed facts establish that 
Columbia reduced Dr. Mathews' privileges from courtesy privileges 
to temporary privileges in the course of its normal staff review 
processes and in accordance with its own bylaws.  Because 
Columbia's reduction of Dr. Mathews' privileges was as consistent 
with the lawful motive of following its bylaws as with an 
anticompetitive motive, we believe the evidence does not support 
an inference of an antitrust conspiracy.  Id.  We will affirm the 
district court's grant of summary judgment to Columbia Hospital 
as well. 
                       B. Antitrust Injury 
         The district court entered summary judgment for 
defendants on the alternative ground that Dr. Mathews had not 
produced evidence raising an issue of material fact as to the 
existence of an antitrust injury.  In antitrust cases, a 
plaintiff must prove "injury of the type the antitrust laws were 
intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes 
defendants' acts unlawful."  Alberta Gas Chemicals Ltd. v. E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours and Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1240 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 
477, 489 (1977)), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).  In other 
words, because "antitrust law aims to protect competition, not 
competitors, [a court] must analyze the antitrust injury question 
from the viewpoint of the consumer."  Id. at 1241.  "An antitrust 
plaintiff must prove that challenged conduct affected the prices, 
quantity or quality of goods or services," not just his own 
welfare.  Tunis Bros. Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 
728 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1221 (1992). 
         The district court found the evidence does not support 
the existence of an antitrust injury resulting from a restriction 
on Dr. Mathews' privileges at Lancaster General because 
orthopedic services are still readily available to consumers in 
the Lancaster area from a large and ever-increasing number of 
providers.  Opinion and Order, slip op. at 21.  The district 
court also pointed out that the Board's restrictions on Dr. 
Mathews' privileges do not completely extinguish Dr. Mathews' 
ability to provide low cost services, but merely curtail his 
ability to perform spine surgery at Lancaster General.  We 
believe the record supports the district court's conclusions.  
Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment was 
proper. 
 V.  Attorneys' Fees under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act 
         Lancaster General, Orthopedic Associates, and the 
individual defendants argue the district court should have 
awarded them attorneys fees under the Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act's fee shifting provision, 42 U.S.C.  11113.  
They assert the award of attorneys' fees to prevailing defendants 
is mandatory under the Act.  We disagree.  "[T]he appropriate 
standard of review of a district court's decision regarding the 
award of attorney fees and costs under the [Act] is abuse of 
discretion."  Muzquiz v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., Inc., 70 F.3d 
422, 431-32 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 
1478, 1487 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1400 (1995); 
Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 964 F.2d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 1992). 
         To recover under  11113 "defendants must establish (1) 
that they are among the persons covered by  11111; (2) that the 
standards set in  11112(a) were followed; (3) that they 
substantially prevailed; and (4) that [plaintiff's] claims or 
conduct during the litigation were frivolous, unreasonable, 
without foundation or in bad faith."  Wei v. Bodner, 1992 WL 
165860 at *2 (D. N.J.).  Defendants have concededly established 
the first three elements.  The district court denied fees on the 
grounds that Dr. Mathews' suit was not "frivolous, unreasonable, 
without foundation or in bad faith."  It concluded, "[t]he 
majority of the case law was not sufficiently established for us 
to say that plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, 
without foundation, or in bad faith."  It also noted that "[n]ot 
all of the facts were known to plaintiff at the filing of this 
case," and "[p]laintiff's state law claims were dismissed without 
prejudice."  See Order, Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., Nos. 93- 
6774, 94-4647 (June 9, 1995). 
         We believe that "it is important . . . [to] resist the 
understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by 
concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, 
his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation." 
Muzquiz v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., Inc., 70 F.3d at 432. 
           The district court carefully considered whether Dr. 
Mathews' suit was frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or 
in bad faith.  It correctly pointed out the dearth of case law on 
the Act at the time Dr. Mathews filed suit.  We conclude the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award 
attorneys' fees. 
                         VI.  Conclusion 
         For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
 
 
